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ABSTRACT 
 
Human dignity has long been used as a foundational principle in policy 
documents and ethical guidelines intended to govern various forms of biomedical 
research. Despite the vast amount of literature concerning human dignity and 
embryonic tissues, the majority of biomedical research uses non-embryonic human 
tissue. Hence, this contribution addresses a notable lacuna in the literature: the 
relationship, if any, between human dignity and human tissue. We first elaborate a 
multidimensional understanding of human dignity that overcomes many of the 
shortcomings associated with the use of human dignity in other ethical debates. 
Second, we discuss the relationship between such an understanding of human dignity 
and ‘non-embryonic’ human tissue. Finally we consider the implications of this 
relationship for biomedical research and practice involving human tissue. The 
contribution demonstrates that while human tissue cannot be said to have human 
dignity, human dignity is nevertheless implicated by human tissue, making what we 
do with human tissue and how we do it worthy of moral consideration.  
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It is likely that everyone in an industrialised country has a sample of their tissue on 
file somewhere.[1] This raises numerous ethical concerns in rights-based legal and 
ethical contexts, e.g. respect for privacy,[2] potential abuse and discrimination,[3, 4, 
5] ownership and commercialisation,[6, 7, 8] or respect for cultural and religious 
beliefs.[9, 10] 
These ethical concerns have led to a proliferation of guidelines and policy 
documents that refer to human dignity as a foundational principle,[11, 12] though 
precisely what human dignity is or why it is so important is seldom elaborated.[13] 
At the same time, certain kinds of human tissue—embryos or tissues derived 
from them such as embryonic stem cells—have sparked often heated debates in which 
the concept of human dignity is strongly associated with these kinds of human tissue, 
including claims that these tissues have human dignity.[14] Yet, the vast majority of 
biomedical research involving human tissues does not employ ‘embryonic’ tissues.  
Thus, in light of the fact that our ‘non-embryonic’ tissue is probably being stored 
or used somewhere, that the concept of human dignity is often referred to and 
nonetheless poorly elaborated in ethics guidelines and policies, and that ‘embryonic’ 
tissue has stolen the limelight in ethical debates and discussions concerning human 
dignity, there is an urgent need to address the question of what the relationship is 
between human dignity and ‘non-embryonic’ human tissue, such as blood spot cards, 
adult mesenchymal stem cells, or pathology specimens.  
We shall approach the problem in three steps. First, we shall offer some 
reflections on the meaning and relevance of the concept of human dignity itself. Then, 
we shall consider the extent to which human tissue can be said to have human dignity 
or be related to it. Finally we shall conclude with a reflection on the ethical 
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implications for this relationship between human dignity and human tissue for genetic 
research. 
  
ON THE MEANING AND RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY 
 
The Problem of Human Dignity in Ethics 
Not all references to human dignity are helpful in resolving ethical problems. It 
is not uncommon to encounter the concept of human dignity being appealed to as a 
sort of ethical trump card by two opposing sides of an argument, leading to an ethical 
impasse. This is largely a result of the fact that human dignity is itself a disputed 
concept. The contemporary discussion on the meaning of human dignity can be 
depicted in broad brush strokes as follows.  
 
‘Absolute’ Dignity versus ‘Contingent’ Dignity 
First, there are those who tend to see human dignity as an ‘absolute’ value, and 
those who tend to see dignity as a ‘contingent’ value. 
Absolute understandings of human dignity seek to make human dignity an 
objectively inviolable normative feature of human persons such that any moral 
behaviour that violates this dignity is always morally wrong. An example would be 
understandings of human dignity based on Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, 
which states that a human person should always be treated as an end and never only as 
a means. According to Kant, human beings are hence of absolute worth rather than 
relative worth. Things, and beings other than rational beings, have, according to Kant, 
a relative worth insofar as they are desirable or necessary to an acting subject. “On the 
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other hand,” says Kant, “rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature 
already marks them out as ends in themselves, . . . which are thus objects of 
respect.”[15] Kant’s objective in describing human beings this way was precisely to 
set up an objective principle that could serve as the basis of a practical law. 
Otherwise, Kant feared, without anything of absolute value, no such objective law 
would be possible.[16]   
Contingent understandings of human dignity, on the other hand, see dignity as a 
relative or even subjective value based on, for example, status in society, a degree of 
acquired moral virtue, or even the degree of flourishing or fulfilment one is able to 
achieve in the context of one’s society. Such contingent understandings may refer to 
an individual’s subjective perception of their own self-worth, or to some assessment 
of an individual’s worth in relation to the attainment of some or other social more. An 
example here is Cicero’s definition of dignity in De Inventione (2.55.166) as 
“someone’s virtuous authority which makes him worthy to be honoured with regard 
and respect.”[17] A more contemporary example of contingent dignity might be 
Avishai Margalit’s idea that, unlike for Cicero, dignity is not the honour that accrues 
to virtuous behaviour or social status but the “type of honor that people ought to have 
. . . .”, a sense of self-respect, and a life in a decent society free of humiliation.[18]    
 
Either This or That 
Second, among those who see human dignity as an absolute value, opinions 
differ as to what it is about the human person that should afford the person this 
inviolable moral status. For example, some, like Alan Gewirth, appear to emphasise 
autonomous moral agency as the basis of human dignity.[19] In consequence, any 
violation of this moral autonomy is a violation of human dignity. Others, like Pope 
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Benedict XVI, appear to emphasise the uniqueness of each divinely created human 
life as the basis of human dignity.[20] In consequence, any destruction or harm done 
to the physical life of the biological human organism from the moment of conception 
to the moment of natural death is considered by holders of this position to be a 
violation of human dignity.   
 
Polarisations and Commonalities 
Both the differences between absolute and contingent understandings, and 
between alternative absolute understandings tend to become further polarised and less 
nuanced in the context of public debate. For example, in debates concerning the 
morality of end of life decisions, one side might argue that not allowing a person to 
choose when and how they die is an offence to human dignity (i.e. autonomy), while 
the other side might argue that ending one’s own life prematurely is violation of 
human dignity (i.e. the divine gift of life). Such polarisations are also often apparent 
in the aforementioned debates surrounding the dignity of ‘embryonic’ human tissue. 
This polarisation, however, can be misleading. Like the broad brush strokes used 
to characterise the various positions mentioned above, polarised appeals to human 
dignity conceal the various nuances that may in fact underlie the understandings of 
human dignity in question. For example, though Cicero might appear to emphasise a 
contingent human dignity based on acquired moral virtue, he in fact grounds human 
dignity in a universal human capacity to be morally good based on reason and 
freedom.[17] Thus, one could say that Cicero shares more in common with the more 
‘absolute’ ideas of Kant or Gewirth than would at first appear. Similarly, Benedict 
XVI would seem to demonstrate a far more complex understanding of human dignity 
than simply physical human life. He appears to also recognise human reason and 
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freedom (cf. Kant and Gewirth), as well as the more ‘contingent’ striving for the 
realisation of the kingdom of God in which people subjectively experience their own 
dignity in loving relationship with others (Benedict’s take on the decent, non-
humiliating society, cf. Margalit), as constituent of the divine image, and hence of 
human dignity.[21]  
 
The Importance of Multidimensionality 
It would be naïve to suggest that there are no differences between the various 
understandings of human dignity mentioned above. The point here is that human 
dignity is generally a more complex, multilayered concept than its polemical use in 
ethical debates would often have us believe. The mistake underlying such polarised 
uses of the concept of human dignity—a mistake which gives the misleading 
impression that human dignity is generally grounded in either this or that, rather than 
both this and that—is that they forget that human dignity always refers to the human 
person, and that the human person cannot be reduced to one or other feature. It is 
precisely for this reason, i.e. the multidimensional nature of the human person to 
whom human dignity refers, that we are able to reveal initial, basic commonalities 
between the apparently opposing understandings of human dignity mentioned above, 
their differences notwithstanding.  
We maintain, therefore, that human dignity, if it is to be useful and meaningful 
in ethical discourse, must, like the human person, be treated as a multidimensional 
concept. What follows is an overview of our proposed understanding of human 
dignity, which endeavours to avoid privileging one or other aspect of the human 
person as the basis for the claim that human persons have human dignity, but which 
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instead seeks to ground human dignity in the fullness of the human person as an 
historically situated, meaning-seeking being in relationship to all that is.   
 
A Multidimensional Understanding of Human Dignity  
The human person is both an ontological reality and an existential reality, i.e., 
one is, but one is also in the process of living out one’s life. This means that dignity 
must likewise refer to the worth (from the Latin dignitas) both of what one 
ontologically is as a human person (absolute), and of the existentially meaningful 
moral life that one chooses to lead (contingent). Thus, dignity is both something one 
has and something that one acquires. These two aspects of human dignity, i.e. the 
dignity one has and the dignity one acquires, can be more systematically elaborated as 
follows (note that all of the features mentioned below combine to form a proper 
understanding of human dignity, which cannot be reduced to one or other of these 
elements).  
1) All human beings have dignity because: 
a. They possess a broad range of capacities—including not only the 
traditional notions of reason and free choice, but also capacities of 
emotion, affiliation, play, imagination, and so on.[22,23,24] 
b. These capacities constitute an innate potential, regardless of their 
actual level of development. 
c. The ‘potential’ is the potential to strive to live in a morally 
meaningful way [25,26] 
d. in the historically situated set of relationships in which human beings 
find themselves.[27] We are always in relationship to all of reality. 
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2) Human beings also seek to acquire dignity, i.e., they seek to realise their 
innate potential. 
a. Their acquired dignity is a conscious sense of self-worth,[26, 27] 
b. which is the product of what they believe to be their own morally 
good behaviour.  
 
The Value of Human Dignity for Ethical Discourse 
The value of such a multidimensional understanding of human dignity for ethics 
is that it serves both a descriptive and a normative function.  
It is descriptive in that it can be used to understand why a person engages in a 
particular course of moral behaviour. We can ask, what is the image of a dignified 
person that the person in question desires to become? What social mores nourish this 
image? And what kinds of moral behaviours are seen to promote this image?  
At the same time, human dignity is a normative criterion. And this normativity 
has both ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ aspects. It is a ‘carrot’ because it affirms the inherent 
goodness of the human person and of the human effort to realise a meaningful life in 
relationship to all that is. It thereby encourages people to realise the fullness of their 
dignity and the dignity of others. At the same time, it is a ‘stick’ because it affirms 
that any desired image of the dignified person that requires the diminishment of 
others’ dignity for its own realisation, for example, through violence, is morally bad 
and ought to be prohibited.  
As a consequence of this normative ‘carrot and stick’ feature, to say that human 
beings have human dignity means more than simply saying they are morally relevant. 
The normative dimension of human dignity means that though all people have a right 
to moral integrity in the pursuit of the realisation of their dignity through what they 
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believe to be morally good behaviour, which would be in line with Gewirth’s 
understanding of human dignity, this right is not absolute. The realisation of one’s 
own dignity can never be at the expense of the absolute inherent dignity that inheres 
in human potential. So, for example, it would always be a violation of human dignity 
to kill another human person as punishment for a perceived wrong, because this 
would destroy that person’s potential to realise the fullness of their dignity. Thus, in 
this instance it would be morally legitimate to infringe upon the moral integrity of the 
killer, for example by forcibly putting him in a correctional facility for his safety and 
the safety of others, without violating the ‘absolute’ dignity that inheres in his 
potential. Locking him up and throwing away the key, however, would violate his 
dignity, as the purpose of this use of force is precisely to humiliate him through 
punishment, rather than to give him the chance to find alternative ways to acquire a 
legitimate sense of worth working for the good of others. Thus, the task for 
policymakers and individuals alike is to balance the ‘carrot’ with the ‘stick’, because, 
unlike the scenario of the violent person, most other areas of moral decision making 
are not as clear cut.  
This ‘un-clear-cut-ness’ brings us to the final argument for the value of the 
multidimensional understanding of human dignity presented here. Due to the 
limitations of our historical situatedness, it is practically impossible to have a morally 
good behaviour that has no potential negative (though not necessarily morally bad) 
downside. Thus, though we all believe that what we do in our pursuit of the moral 
good of our dignity and the dignity of others is morally good, we can be certain 
neither that it is morally good, nor that the way in which we are seeking to achieve it 
is morally the best one. This means that the full realisation of human dignity always 
remains beyond our grasp, both inspiring us to act in a morally good way (the 
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‘carrot’), and reminding us to be humble and prudent in our moral reflections and 
behaviour (the ‘stick’).  
If we accept the above multidimensional understanding of human dignity as both 
something we have and something we can acquire, then to protect human dignity 
means to protect both the potential inherent in our capacities and the realised sense of 
self-worth that results from the development and application of these capacities in 
moral behaviour insofar as this behaviour does not remove the potential of others to 
realise their dignity.[28] 
 
VIEWING HUMAN TISSUE THROUGH THE LENS OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
Human Tissue Does Not Have Human Dignity 
In light of the above understanding, it is clear that human tissue does not possess 
human dignity. Tissue has no moral agency—potential or otherwise. Moreover, apart 
from its genetic makeup which identifies it as human, human tissue cannot be said to 
have even the most rudimentary qualities of personhood. Human tissue is not a human 
person, and hence cannot have human dignity.  
This conclusion is not significantly different than that which most other 
established understandings of human dignity should reach with respect to human 
tissue. An exception may be an extreme version of a species membership based 
understanding of human dignity, which might argue that the tissue has human dignity 
because it contains the DNA for a unique human being. Nevertheless, as demonstrated 
in the discussion above concerning the polarisations and commonalities in various 
understandings of human dignity above, we doubt that any such truly extreme 
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understanding of human dignity actually exists. If it did, one should not call it human 
dignity. 
 
Human Dignity Is Still Implicated by Human Tissue 
The concept of human dignity is nevertheless relevant to ethical discussions 
concerning human tissue.  
We have said that the protection of human dignity entails both the protection of 
inherent potential, and of realised self-worth. Human tissue in the context of modern 
biomedical research implicates both of these.  
(a) Human tissue and human potential. Tissue contains genes, and genetic 
science is increasingly making genes a socially relevant aspect of identity.[29] E.g., 
one’s genes identify one as a human being, and hence as one like others, as one who 
in principle shares the same basic potential as all other human beings and hence is 
worthy of protection and respect. At the same time, however, genes identify one as 
white or black, male or female, sick or healthy, and hence as one different from 
others. Who one is perceived to be, by oneself and by others, has important 
implications for the realisation of human dignity, because these perceptions can either 
facilitate (e.g. in the case of universal human rights) or frustrate (e.g. in the case of 
racism or sexism) the realisation of a sense of self-worth for all human beings. 
(b) Human tissue and acquired self-worth. A person realises his or her potential 
(the dignity one has) through morally good interactions: social norms usually 
associate dignity with moral goodness. Hence, a person will behave in a way that he 
or she believes to be morally good and thereby acquire a sense of self-worth. This 
sense of moral goodness may often be paired with existentially meaningful moral 
convictions of a cultural or religious nature. The human tissue found in modern 
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biomedical research is often there as a result of a moral decision on the part of the 
donor/participant. At the core of this decision will most often lie the belief that such a 
donation will be for the good of the donor or for others.[30] Through the ‘morally 
good’ donation of his or her tissue, the donor gains a sense of self-worth.  
Thus, human tissue in the context of biomedical research is a concrete symbol of 
both the absolute (the dignity we have) and the contingent (the dignity we acquire) 
aspects of the dignity of a particular donor/participant with a particular genetic 
makeup and potential, and particular moral convictions and behaviours that help him 
or her to lead an existentially meaningful life with others. At the same time, because 
its genetic makeup identifies the tissue as human, it is also a symbol of the inherent 
dignity that all human beings already have.  
This is where the understanding of human dignity developed in this contribution 
as necessarily multidimensional may lead to a somewhat different conclusion 
regarding the relationship between human dignity and human tissue than other 
established understandings of human dignity. For example, an understanding of 
human dignity that emphasises an absolute dignity based on human autonomy would 
be of little value in the discussion of human tissue unless it could also include the 
contingent fruits of this autonomy that arise from moral behaviour. Similarly, a 
concept of human dignity that emphasises only the absolute value of biological life, 
while possibly able to make a claim regarding the moral link between human tissue 
and the inherent dignity of all human beings based on species membership, would not 
be able to be used to claim protection for the autonomy of individuals or their moral 
integrity.  
Thus, a multidimensional understanding of human dignity resists a reduction of 
human dignity to a one-dimensional, debate-ending, truncheon, and functions instead 
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as an interpretive lens through which we can reflect on and weigh the many morally 
relevant features of human personhood that are brought into play through research on 
human tissue. What follows is illustrative of such a ‘dignity-driven’ reflection. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN TISSUE RESEARCH 
 
Working with Human Tissue Constitutes Moral Behaviour 
The symbolic nature of human tissue described above means that interactions 
with human tissue in the context of biomedical research and practice constitute moral 
behaviour, i.e., behaviour that people judge to be right or wrong, good or bad. It is not 
moral behaviour just because it involves human tissue; hairdressers sweep away 
human tissue all the time. It is moral behaviour because in biomedical research it is 
the tissue that is of specific interest. Due to the ‘symbolic’ nature of the relationship 
between human tissue and human dignity, human tissue always points to where the 
tissue comes from, and the ends for which it will be used. So, when we work with 
human tissue in the research context we are in effect ‘touching’ the human dignity of 
the donor and indeed of human beings in general. A person has ‘entrusted’ an aspect 
of his or her dignity to us, both in terms of his or her genetic identity (absolute) and in 
terms of the values that may have motivated his or her donation in the first place 
(contingent).  
Moreover, because it is human tissue, the research will have potential 
consequences for all humankind, and hence also implicates human dignity in the 
broadest sense. Thus, even if the samples are anonymised, human dignity is still 
implicated.  
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The Dignity of the Researcher 
Because these interactions constitute moral behaviour, the dignity of the 
researcher is also implicated. The treatment of the tissue and the moral convictions 
that underpin it are relevant to the researcher’s acquisition of a realised sense of self-
worth through his or her moral behaviour. No one would want to be known as a 
sloppy researcher following an avoidable breach of donor privacy.  
Thus, both a refusal to engage in particular kinds of genetic research, and active 
support for such research may be underpinned by convictions concerning the moral 
rightness or wrongness of such research. Both refusers and supporters could claim that 
their position furthers human dignity, thereby furthering their own sense of acquired 
dignity. And as long as it is impossible to show that their position constitutes a denial 
or diminishment of the potential of others to realise their dignity, neither position can 
be said to be definitively morally wrong, though it may still be possible to discuss 
which position may be morally better or more morally prudent. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Ethics is about leading a good life, about realising our dignity and the dignity of 
others. But the concept of human dignity cannot tell us concretely how to do that. The 
relationship between human dignity and human tissue developed here does not 
provide easy answers for biomedical research and practice. Dignity is not a simple 
criterion that always makes it possible to judge which treatment of human tissue 
violates human dignity. And the vast majority of research on human tissue would 
never violate human dignity, especially since the tissue itself has no ontological 
human dignity.  
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Yet it is in helping us not to lose sight of the moral relevance of where the tissue 
comes from and the end for which it will be used that the concept of human dignity is 
useful. It helps us to remain aware that human tissue, and especially how we use it, 
nevertheless merits our moral consideration. One believes that what one does with 
human tissue in the research context is good and right, because one hopes to realise 
one’s dignity and the dignity of others through morally good behaviour. But one 
cannot know that one is right. Thus, a multidimensional understanding of human 
dignity shows us that what we do with human tissue is our responsibility, which at the 
same time means that it is our responsibility. For this reason, prudence and humility 
remain essential virtues.  
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